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“It Wasn’t Supposed to Be Easy” 
What the Founders Originally Intended 
for the Senate’s Advice and Consent 
Role in Supreme Court Confirmation 
Process 
Michael Wilt 
History and Government 
Introduction  
ince 2013, the President of the United States has nominated four Supreme Court contenders 
for the United States Senate to consider. In 2013, President Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced 
United States Solicitor General Elena Kagan as his choice to succeed retiring Associate 
Justice John Paul Stevens. Solicitor General Kagan had an impressive career that proceeded her ¬— 
U.S. Solicitor General during the Obama Administration and an Associate Counsel to President 
Clinton. At the end of the confirmation process, she received a 63-37 confirmation vote, surpassing 
the 60-vote threshold necessary for confirmation, and with bipartisan support from moderate 
Republican senators (Gura). Additionally, Elena Kagan received a favorable reception from most 
media outlets and a bipartisan response from Republican senators despite her more liberal 
leanings. 
Judge Merrick Garland was not so fortunate. Following the sudden passing of conservative icon and 
Supreme Court Associate Justice, Antonin Scalia, President Obama had the opportunity to ‘flip’ the 
conservative seat with a more liberal justice. However, following the 2014 midterm elections, the 
Republican Party easily claimed control of the Senate, flipping nine Democratic Senate seats in a 
Republican-wave election season (Elving). Although President Obama was working with a 
Republican Senate majority (Weaver, 1721), President Obama introduced U.S. District Court of 
Appeals Judge Merrick Garland as his nominee in March of 2016 (Elving). Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY) announced that he would block all opportunities of President Obama in 
flipping the conservative seat on the Supreme Court and declared that the next President — 
regardless of party — should choose the next Supreme Court nominee (Elving). President Obama 
countered Majority Leader McConnell on two fronts: First, President Obama declared that the 
Senate should fulfill its constitutional obligation to confirm or reject the nominee under the guise of 
its advice and consent function (Elving); and, second, President Obama pointed out that Judge 
Merrick Garland received bipartisan approval for his current position in the federal judiciary, and 
he would appeal to both Republican and Democratic constituencies. 
S 
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However, Majority Leader McConnell calculated the political risks and kept the seat open for 293 
days (Bravin). In the end, the Senate full-body and even the Senate Judiciary never official 
considered Judge Garland for the Supreme Court vacancy (Elving). Per Senate procedure, when the 
114th Congress’ term expired on 3 January 2017, so did Garland’s nomination.  
President Donald Trump announced Judge Neil Gorsuch, 49, to serve as the next Supreme Court 
Justice on January 31, 2017. Judge Gorsuch received an introduction from his home-state Senators 
of Colorado — Michael Bennet (D) and Cory Gardner (R) — and continued to meet with Senators 
individually before and during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. 
Judge Gorsuch’s supporters praised his record as bipartisan and steady and cited his record of 97% 
voting in unanimous decisions (Killough and Barrett). Republicans in the Senate were distraught 
that Democrats strongly opposed the nomination. Ultimately, attempts were made to clear the 60-
vote threshold of avoiding filibusters and to garner a smooth, traditional confirmation. However, 
Senate Majority Leader McConnell announced that the senate would utilize the “nuclear option” to 
confirm Judge Gorsuch’s nomination. The then-Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) originally used 
the “nuclear option” in 2013 to confirm lower judicial nominees and executive nominees by 
requiring simple-majority passage (Killough and Barrett). Many worried that lowering the 
threshold for votes would result in more ideological nominees to the highest court and a less 
bipartisan reaction to the confirmation process as a whole (Killough and Barrett). Though senators 
lamented the use of the nuclear option, many still supported Judge Gorsuch’s nomination, resulting 
in a 54-45 final confirmation (Killough and Barrett). 
Most recently, President Trump nominated Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals to replace retiring-Justice Anthony Kennedy on July 9, 2018 (Bowden). After Judge 
Kavanaugh had been the nominee for twenty days, Christine Blasey Ford accused Judge Kavanaugh 
of sexual assault back in college in the 1980s (Bowden).  
After two grueling weeks of intense FBI investigations, the FBI produced an inconclusive report on 
the allegations. The Senate voted on cloture for the motion to vote on Judge Kavanaugh’s 
nomination. The final vote was 50-48 (Bowden). 
These four confirmation processes to the Supreme Court, all within a five-year timespan, are 
completely divergent of each other, leading many Americans to question the reliability of the 
Supreme Court confirmation process — and even the legitimacy of the judiciary. On the one hand, 
blatant partisanship and polarization has hindered the political process in dramatic, dysfunctional, 
and unnecessary fashion. On the other hand, complacency in a more subtle way negatively harms 
the process as a rubber-stamp for the President. There is a definite disconnect in what the 
American people perceive the Senate’s advice and consent function to be in comparison to what the 
Founders originally intended for the Senate. The terminology of advice and consent is vague and 
inconclusive, unless in proper context. 
A lack of understanding on what the Framers’ originally intended for the Senate’s advice and 
consent role has major implications for the health and well-being of the constitutional republic. It 
affects the process in selecting capable, qualified, and willing justices to the country’s highest Court, 
and the understanding of the role checks and balances play within the constitutionally designed 
federal framework. The Founders authored the Appointments Clause in a particular manner for a 
particular reason. The Framers took painstakingly lengthy amounts of time in crafting the 




Appointments Clause specifically and cared deeply about the distribution of the appointment 
power. 
Therefore, a proper understanding and review of what the Founders originally intended for the 
Senate’s role in the Supreme Court confirmation process will be both pertinent and beneficial to the 
overall discussion on the Senate’s advice and consent function. Many individuals have developed 
various theories surrounding this subject. Some argue for a more passive and deferential Senate; 
one that will support the President’s nominee if he or she is highly qualified and within the 
mainstream of judicial thought (McMillion, 5-6; Olson, 9-23; Ross, 681). Others advocate for a more 
robust and active Senate that seeks a thorough evaluation of the nominee’s background, 
qualifications, judicial temperance, and judicial philosophies (Sklamberg, 461; Ross, 639; Gauch, 
340-1; Kasper, 550). Some even argue that the Senate is constitutionally obligated to hold a full-
body Senate vote on the nominee (e.g., President’s Obama, Bush, Jr.). These viewpoints will be 
discussed at length during the literature review. 
Therefore, various questions will guide the research project to conclude how the Founders’ 
originally intended for the Senate to act during the Supreme Court confirmation process. First, what 
did the Founders intend for the Senate’s role in the Supreme Court confirmation process as 
developed through the Constitutional Convention proceedings and other manuscripts like the 
Federalist Papers? Second, how did the Framers’ view on human nature, and the original election 
method for U.S. Senators affect the Framers’ view on the Senate’s role? Third, should the Senate 
defer to the President’s nomination and only consider their professional qualifications, or is the 
Senate afforded certain discretionary powers under the guise of the Appointments Clause to use the 
candidate’s professional qualifications, partisan politics, and constitutional philosophies of the 
candidate for evaluation? And finally, is the Senate constitutionally obligated to evaluate the 
nominee and hold a full-body vote on the candidate? 
The Founders — as according to their understanding of human natures, early manuscripts, 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, and early development of the Supreme Court 
confirmation process — originally intended for the Senate’s role to be one of actively offering 
advice to the President on which candidate to nominate to the Supreme Court. The Senate was 
expected to evaluate the President’s nominee in a manner in which the Senate chooses, in the 
Senate’s timetable, and under the guise of its established procedures — which allowed for the 
review of professional qualifications, partisan considerations, and judicial philosophy. The 
electorate changed the original Senate election method, which provided for a degree of separation 
between the Senate and the American electorate, to direct election of senators by the electorate, 
thereby inaugurating a new level of partisanship into the Supreme Court confirmation processes. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the judiciary has been called into question as a result. Ultimately, the 
Founders intended for the Senate to hold a vote on the Supreme Court nominee. 
Literature Review 
Understanding the Senate’s advice and consent role within the scope of the Appointments Clause 
has been an issue of constitutional matter since its inception at the Constitutional Convention. As 
the records show in the Constitutional Convention, the Founders constantly disagreed on the best 
branch of government to position the appointment power and to what extent that power reached 
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(see Max Farrand’s anthology; Gauch, 351, 361; Hunt). Despite the breadth of discourse over the 
appointment power, Adam White, a Harvard Law graduate, notes that “[the] meaning of advice and 
consent is not self-evident, and the means of its proper application are not obvious” (108). Some 
scholars argue that while consent may be an easier concept to comprehend, advice is not 
completely understood (Sklamberg, 447-8). Advice  usually indicates that the “recipient is not 
obliged to receive it” (Sklamberg, 447-8; McMillion, 5-6). The advice and consent role is a nebulous 
undertaking and requires a broad context in order to fully grasp the implications involved in 
reviewing the Founders’ original intent for the Senate’s role (Gauch, 339). 
Most of the existing literature focuses in on the current confirmation process and the partisanship 
that has plagued the evaluation of Supreme Court nominees by the U.S. Senate. However, the 
literature that details the Founder’s original view of the Senate’s role in the Supreme Court 
confirmation process centers on the Constitutional Convention and the development of the 
proceedings (Farrand; White, 111-113; Harris, 21-25; Ross; Gauch). However, there is room to 
explore an originalist approach to the confirmation process as understood by the Founders. As 
mentioned above, there was a constant back-and-forth debate over which branch to install the 
appointment power. Adam White wrote in review of the Convention that “[one] group of delegates, 
led by James Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur 9 Morris, favored 
control of appointments by a strong executive” while the “opposing camp, led by Charles Pinckney, 
Luther Martin, George Mason, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and John Rutledge, favored 
legislative control of the appointments process” (110-1). 
There are also a number of different writings by Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other 
Founders that display the ambiguity and complexity over the development of the Appointments 
Clause (Gauch, 351, 361; Hunt). There are even competing views on how Alexander Hamilton 
interpreted the Appointments Clause. Bruce Fein, a Washington Times author, suggests that 
Hamilton would have opposed the use of ideology or partisanship from plaguing the judicial 
confirmation process, thereby affirming a more passive Senate role (672). Likewise, New York Bar 
member William Ross writes that Hamilton saw the Appointments Clause as mostly resting in the 
President’s authority, and not in the Senate. Therefore, the Senate should acquiesce to the 
President’s nominee unless disqualifying factors become apparent. In contrast, Eric Kasper believes 
that because Hamilton viewed the Appointments Clause of Article II in the U.S. Constitution as a 
shared power between the executive and the Senate, the Senate should be allowed to evaluate 
nominees’ ideologies. Continuing, Kasper asserts that Hamilton would advocate for an energetic 
Senate that would hold a more active role of the Senate (567). 
However, the issue with these analyses centers on the lack of evaluating their original intent in 
formulating the advice and consent clause of the Appointments Clause. By not fleshing that out in 
the text itself, the Framers then left the Senate’s function open for interpretation to the Senate as to 
what their function should be. A simple reading of the text will showcase the clause’s elusiveness: 
“…[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court…” (Article II, 
Section 2, Appointments Clause, U.S. Constitution) As a result, various analyses that combine 
elements of either a more passive Senate role or a more active and energetic Senate function have 
led to different interpretations of  the literature. 




Multiple scholars assert that the Senate should take a more active and energetic role under the 
guise of the Senate’s advice and consent function (Sklamberg, 461; Ross, 639; Gauch, 340-1; Kasper, 
550). Howard Sklamberg, a Harvard Law School graduate, suggests that the Senate is a powerful 
body when placed in the proper context, and that the Senate should assume a more active role in its 
advice and consent duty (461). William Ross and James Gauch, respectively, would both agree with 
this assertion and point to the development of the Appointments Clause as evidence that the 
Framers intended for a more active Senate (Ross, 639; Gauch, 340-1). 
Those in support of a more active Senate as part of the Founders’ original understanding tend to 
point to early state actions. Sklamberg — writing of the Senate’s advice and consent role as it 
pertains to treaty-making — discussed the governor’s broad power as it related to the legislative 
branch of state governments, which was usually the Privy Council (461). Overall, Sklamberg 
stresses the importance of context surrounding the meaning of advice and consent. Sklamberg finds 
that American state governments at the time of ratification of the U.S. Constitution perceived a 
shared power between the executive and legislative arms of government, indicating implicitly that 
an active Senate is required (461). 
Contrasting the more active Senate model, multiple scholars claim that the Framers intended for 
the Senate’s role in the Supreme Court confirmation process to be passive and deferential to the 
president’s choice in general (Olson, 9-23; Ross, 681). Separation of powers scholar for the Library 
of Congress, Barry J. McMillion, notes the more deferential Senate theory without endorsing its 
framework: “The Framers…contemplated the Senate performing an advisory, or recommending, 
role to the President prior to his selection of a nominee, in addition to a confirming role afterwards” 
(McMillion 5-6). Here, McMillion’s depiction of a more deferential Senate role seems to mirror the 
text of the Appointments Clause (Art. II, Sec. 2, U.S. Constitution). While the Senate — whether 
individually or collectively — can recommend to the President a set of potential Supreme Court 
nominees, the President would be the one in charge of nominating (Gauch, 351; Grossman & Wasby, 
559; Ross, 642; Fisher, 21-27). Then, the Senate would offer a deferential response through a 
confirmation vote by the Senate body. 
The ambiguous language of the Senate’s advice and consent function in the Supreme Court 
confirmation process makes it difficult to understand the role of individual senators. The literature 
does not clarify how much depth the Senators could individually — or collectively — influence the 
President to nominate someone to the Supreme Court, save for Schweitzer’s work. Such a deficiency 
of existing discourse on an individual senator’s impact on the confirmation process can be an 
avenue for further research. 
When discussing the role of individual senators, some scholars have commented on possible 
actions. McMillion stresses the importance of the role an active Senator can provide by “candidly 
inform[ing] a President of their objections to a prospective nominee”. In informing the President, 
the senator “may help in identifying shortcomings in that candidate or the possibility of a 
confirmation battle in the Senate, which the President might want to avoid” (McMillion, 6). Here, 
McMillion suggests that an active, individual Senator can make a difference in reviewing potential 
Supreme Court candidates. However, some scholars argue that a single Senator’s ability to block the 
nomination of a judicial candidate during the confirmation process — whether through a filibuster 
(Schweitzer, 916), or even a Senate Judiciary chairman (Denning, 28) — can be detrimental to the 
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constitutional framework. Schweitzer sees this as an institutional issue that harms the overall 
confirmation process (916). 
Several senators have written about their responsibility of advice and consent. Senator Susan 
Collins (R-ME) spoke on the Senate floor about her decision to confirm Judge Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court in 2018. Based on Federalist No. 76, she has “interpreted this to mean that the 
president has broad discretion” in nominating a candidate, and that her position as a Senator is to 
“focus on the nominee’s qualifications as long as that nominee’s philosophy is within the 
mainstream of judicial thought” (Collins). Here, Senator Collins qualifies a more deferential 
philosophy to her advice and consent role. Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) stated that the Senate must 
review whether or not Judge Kavanaugh has “the temperament and the character to take his policy 
views and his political preferences and put them in a box marked irrelevant set it aside every 
morning when he puts on the black robe” (Sasse). Joseph Harris quoted Senator Paul Douglas in his 
book The Advice and Consent of the Senate on page 302 about the role of the Senate: 
The “advice and consent” of the Senate required by the Constitution for such appointments was 
intended to be real and not nominal…By requiring joint action of the legislature and the executive, it 
was believed that the judiciary would be made more independent. There was a second 
advantage…This was that a Senator from a given state would normally know the ability, capacities 
and integrity of the lawyers and judges within that state better than could a President. 
Senator Douglas cites the belief the Founders had in producing a more legitimate judiciary through 
dual-appointment mode (Harris, 302). 
Scholars differ most over the Senate’s ability to review a potential Supreme Court nominee’s 
judicial philosophy, constitutional beliefs, or political tendencies. Such divergent opinions influence 
how the scholars support a more active or more passive Senate role. Bruce Fein argues that under 
the “Hamiltonian model,” judicial philosophy questioning could not be sufficient ground to reject a 
Supreme Court nominee (672). Fein believed that concerning the Bork hearings, Senators abused 
their advice and consent function by opposing his nomination based on ideological grounds of 
which they were not qualified to judge given their disposition to partisanship (673). Fein 
contributes to the literature in a unique way by pointing to how state legislature originally elected 
senators. Fein implicitly argues that re-election considerations should not be made when evaluating 
Supreme Court nominees (674). There is, however, more room to explore on the Senate’s original 
election methods, and how that impacted the Framers’ understanding of external forces factoring 
into Senators’ evaluation of Supreme Court nominees.  
Stephen Carter — a foremost thinker on the issue and a Yale law professor — discussed the ways 
for the Senate to review nominees. Carter argues that the Senate should assume that the nominee is 
unqualified and should actively seek to find out the nominee’s qualifications (159). Such an 
argument departs from the deference accorded to most Supreme Court nominees in years past 
(Fein; Ross, 681). However, Carter believes this should focus solely on understanding the Supreme 
Court candidate’s moral character, “legal aptitude, skills, and experience” (161-62), and should 
remain detached from his or her judicial philosophy and constitutional beliefs (Kagan, 931). 
Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan finds this view both naïve and impractical. She believes that the 
Senate and President should review the nominee carefully and understand what the candidate’s 
vision of the Court is as well as how the candidate would influence the Court if appointed (934). 




Kasper’s view, among others, contrasted Fein’s view in that he believed that “some political 
partiality would be acceptable in judicial appointments” (555). Kasper, and other researchers held 
to this view of the Supreme Court confirmation process given Madison’s view on rejecting Supreme 
Court nominees (Gauch, 347; Grossman & Wasby, 561; Ross, 634-5; Harris, 43). Many arguing for 
the more active Senate believed that the Senate should be afforded the opportunity to find out 
where the nominee stands on judicial philosophy, moral vision, and the overall role of the Supreme 
Court (Kagan, 934).  
In his book, former Solicitor General of the United States Theodore Olson discusses the major 
problems with contemporary Supreme Court confirmations including the “nothing is off-limits” 
mentality that plagues the Supreme Court confirmation process (9-23). Olson contends that the 
Senate’s role should be passive and only act in response to the President’s nomination. Olson 
suggests that the Senate has transcended its constitutional role in its partisan evaluation methods 
for Supreme Court nominees. Other scholars would agree with Olson’s view of allowing for more 
deference to the President’s nominee to the Supreme Court (Ross, 161). 
However, some researchers counter this argument, asserting that throughout history, the Senate’s 
deference has simply amounted to “rubber-stamping,” and it is not true to the spirit of the 
Constitution (Friedland 175; Carter, 85; Carter, 159). Dr. Steven Friedland — a Law Professor at 
Elon University School of Law — contends that the ratification model does not allow room for the 
Senate to do its due diligence in fulfilling its advisory role. Moreover, Professors Joel Grossman and 
Stephen Wasby argue against the notion that the same deference accorded to a president’s cabinet 
nominee should be extended to judicial nominees as an “unsound argument” (561). Grossman and 
Wasby believe there are fundamental differences between the judiciary and the cabinet that 
necessitate a deeper evaluation of judicial candidates: duration of office; the judiciary is a co-equal 
branch; presidential actions were political (561). 
Several scholars — especially those favoring an active Senate role in checking presidential 
appointments — strongly believed in a collaborative nature between the legislative and executive 
branches on the appointment of the judiciary (Kasper 556-7; Ross, 653; Fisher, 35; Lively; Carter, 
85; Gauch 340-1). Moreover, Kasper argues that Hamilton anticipated an energetic role for the 
Senate, one in which the Senate would be “actively offering ‘advice’ on whom future Supreme Court 
nominees should be” (568). Arthur Bestor, Professor Emeritus at the University of Washington, 
writes that the Founders at the time understood “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate” 
to mean that the Senate would be directly involved in consulting with the President where 
constitutionally applicable (726). In doing so, Bestor and Kasper each offer the reader an example 
of how the Senate and the President can interact when it comes to the appointment process. 
The Founders’ level of distrust for the government served as the rationale for a collaborative format 
in nominating candidates to the Supreme Court (Weaver, 1724). Moreover, Weaver discusses the 
nature of checks and balances as well as the separation of powers as installed by the Framers’ in 
order to provide a check on the President’s selection power. Weaver describes the system as 
purposefully inefficient (1752-53). McMillion also pointed out that senators have grasped the 
critical importance of the function they serve in checking presidential appointments to the third, co-
equal branch of government, and have done their due diligence overall in their review of those 
candidates (2). Donald Lively writes that it is even unconstitutional if the Senate does not diligently 
review the nominee (Lively). 
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Eric Kasper also points to the Federalist Papers’ authority in his research, specifically tracking 
James Madison’s argument for the necessity of checks and balances to counteract the depravity of 
man and man’s ultimate desire to accomplish his own ambition (545). Kasper quotes Hamilton at 
length to describe the more active role the Senate should pursue within the judicial confirmation 
process — especially for the Supreme Court nominees, given that the Supreme Court is a third, co-
equal branch of government (557). Other authors cite this theme of human depravity and a distrust 
of the government frequently (see Madison’s Fed. Nos. 48-51). Stephen Friedland authors a rebuttal 
to Weaver’s article. Friedland writes that this system develops an outlet for transparency and 
allows for the Senate to properly check the President by fully investigating and evaluating the 
nominee (177-178). Friedland believes this advice and consent function will serve as a check to the 
presidential appointment in a way that will even “modify the behavior of the participants” (177). 
Another interpretation of the Appointments Clause — as an extension of the active Senate model — 
holds to the notion that the Senate is constitutionally obligated to offer advice to the President as 
well as consent to the nominee through a thorough review of each nominee (Herman; White; 
Fisher). Most of the scholarship that demands a vote on any Supreme Court nominee stems mostly 
from recent statements. Specifically, modern Presidents like President Obama in 2017 and George 
Bush in 2005 articulated that the Senate held a constitutional obligation to vote on the President’s 
nominee (Herman, 2-3). Adam White, however, opposed the notion that the Senate must hold a full-
body, up-or-down vote on every Supreme Court nominee presented by the President (109). 
Critically acclaimed separation of powers scholar, Louis Fisher argues that the Constitution’s 
vagueness affords the Senate some flexibility in its dealings with potential Supreme Court 
nominations (34-35). Both White and Fisher would argue that the U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly call for the Senate to act on all nominations (White, 109; Fisher, 34-35). Supporting 
Fisher’s assertion, Herman provides a textual analysis of the Appointments Clause and correctly 
points out that the Appointments Clause does not contain a “shall” that would require the Senate to 
officially act (2).  
Moreover, Fisher argued that the Senate does not even have to hold hearings or review the 
nominee, as it is within the scope of the Senate’s powers to withhold its advice and consent power 
by either dragging out the timetable on the confirmation process or killing the nomination by not 
holding hearings (34-35). To that end, there are a number of resources that discuss the 
confirmation processes that the Senate has undertaken since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution 
(see Suggested Further Readings). Additionally, there are a lot of references to review the extent of 
support each nominee received in their respective confirmation hearings as well as the length of 
the process. Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, and Walker pulled together a massive compendium on the 
Supreme Court that reviews these processes (374-424).  Moreover, the Senate itself has established 
a number of rules, precedents, and traditions by which it operates. As a formal institution, these 
rules — though sometimes archaic by nature — govern the processes and proceedings of the 
Senate. Therefore, it is important to note where those resources can be found.  Martin Gold offers a 
comprehensive, up to date listing of those rules that govern the appointment process. Gold’s work 
states that the Senate can utilize the traditions and precedents it has established to slow down or 
kill a Supreme Court nomination (Gold, 216-17). 
Contrastingly, Schweitzer contends that by not completing an evaluation of the nominee — 
especially if a single senator chooses to filibuster the nomination — then the Senate is sequestering 
too much power from the President. Schweitzer would oppose Fisher’s assertion that the Senate is 




accorded discretion in how it proceeds on each nomination. Schweitzer decries the inaction of the 
Senate as a constitutional problem (916). Schweitzer in a way confirms the constitutional 
obligation model in quoting Hamilton by stating that Hamilton viewed the Advice and Consent 
Clause as providing for a ratification or rejection plan (919-920). However, Schweitzer still argued 
that the Senate’s advisory role came prior to the President’s nomination, thereby following the 
more recommendation model approach (920). 
Overall, the complexity of the Appointments Clause is apparent and glaring. Especially given the 
recent heated Supreme Court confirmation hearings, dramatic votes, and partisan exchanges over 
the nominee, a clarification on the Senate’s proper role as understood by the Founders is necessary. 
Several scholars have presented possible ways to reform or clarify the Senate’s role within the 
appointment process. Denning and Carter serve as strong resources in understanding possible 
reforms for the Supreme Court confirmation process. However, despite the abundant amount of 
resources that discuss the appointment power, the lack of agreement among the various others on 
the Founders’ view of the Senate’s role offers a chance to provide analytical clarity. Moreover, the 
dearth of information regarding how the original election methods for the senators plays into their 
confirmation role, or how individual senators can influence the outcome of who is appointed by the 
President and evaluated by the Senate will be avenues for further discussion. In all, an originalist 
approach to the Founders’ understanding of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process for 
Supreme Court justices will contribute to the on-going debate over how the current U.S. Senate 




Defining terms will be both pertinent and beneficial to develop a strong foundation and baseline 
understanding of the terms in use throughout the research process. For example, as the research 
process unfolds, the definitions for words such as ‘advice’ and ‘consent’ will be analyzed and 
scrutinized. Some individuals have tried to define these two terms based on contemporary 
understanding. However, the issue with this understanding dilutes the meaning of the clause in its 
proper context. This leads to a dysfunctional confirmation process with multiple competing 
viewpoints that do not consider a balanced approach to reviewing Supreme Court nominees. 
However, the respective context of these terms will give more substantive meaning to their usage 
and application, while simultaneously pointing the research to a more conclusive end on the 
Framers’ understanding. 
Law Professor Steven Calabresi defines ‘originalism’ as when “the constitutional text ought to be 
given the original public meaning that it would have had at the time that it became law” (Calabresi). 
Additionally, the original meaning of the text can be “inferred from the background legal events and 
public debate that gave rise to the constitutional provision” (Calabresi). Moreover, these authors 
view intention of the provision’s application and original understanding as independent of each 
other (Calabresi). David Forte, a Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, defines 
originalism as the following: “those who make, interpret, and enforce the law ought to be guided by 
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the meaning of the United States Constitution – the supreme law of the land – as it was originally 
written” (Forte). Forte believes the “Constitution of 1787 is as much a constitution for us as it was 
for the Founding generation.” 
Additionally, Forte posited a list of components that would serve as guiding principles in 
ascertaining original intent: “the evident meaning of the words”; “the meaning according to the 
words by the Framer suggesting the language”; “the words in the context of political philosophy 
shared by the Founding generation…”; “the commentary in the ratification debates”; “the 
subsequent historical practice by the Founding generation to exemplify the understood meaning”; 
and, “evidence of long-standing traditions,” among many others (Forte). Forte’s developed 
components will serve as the driving principles by which the analysis will be conducted. 
Finally, one must identify the evaluation criteria to establish a common understanding on the 
various forms of consideration senators place in evaluating judicial nominees. ‘Judicial temperance’, 
as written by separation of powers scholar for the Library of Congress Barry J. McMillion, refers to 
“a personality that is evenhanded, unbiased, impartial, courteous yet firm, and dedicated to a 
process, not a result” (McMillion, “President’s Selection,” 12). Additionally, ‘professional 
qualifications’ of judicial nominees can refer to a number of things: biographical information; 
financial disclosures; prior experiences; professional positions and prior judgeships or clerkships; 
prior judicial rulings, opinions, and dissents, among others.  
Early Writings 
For the purposes of this research project, various early writings will be cited in order to fully 
ascertain the intentions of the Founders. Such early writings include the Appointments Clause, the 
Federalist Papers, manuscripts and letters between various Founders and Constitutional 
Convention delegates, and the Constitutional Convention proceedings. The Federalist Papers are a 
collection of eighty-five essays submitted to newspapers in New York to persuade voters and 
delegates to attend the Constitutional Convention and support the ratification of the newly 
proposed Constitution. James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton contributed to the overall 
argument by asserting why certain sections were included in the final document and why others 
were excluded. Moreover, early writings from James Madison, James Wilson, George Washington, 
and Thomas Jefferson will be cited for the purposes of better understanding what the Founders 
believed the appointments process to look like. Finally, Max Farrand’s Records on the 
Constitutional Convention Proceedings (vol. I-III) will be utilized to refer to the development of the 
Appointments Clause and appointment power. 
Methodology 
Throughout the research process, two pertinent forms of qualitative methodology will be deployed 
for a conclusive review of the Framers’ intentions: content analysis and a historic analysis by way of 
a case study. Content analysis, according to Lune and Berg, is “a careful, detailed, systematic 
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, 
themes, assumptions and meanings” (172). By using content analysis, one can critically evaluate 
and analyze the development of the Constitutional Convention proceedings and developments, the 
Federalist Papers, and other manuscripts for key insights. Specific subset writings will be focused 




on more as they pertain specifically to the appointment power. Moreover, special references to the 
appointment power, advice and consent, or Supreme Court will provide a more targeted approach.  
In doing so, historical context, documented assumptions, and intentions underlying the 
Appointments Clause will become more apparent, giving clearer insight into an original 
understanding. Additionally, a critical evaluation of the Founders’ writings will affirm credibility 
and reliability in the authenticity of their intentions. Moreover, the original questions posed at the 
beginning of the paper will be better answered according to the texts themselves.  As a reminder, 
the first question considered what the Founders intended for the Senate’s role in the Supreme 
Court confirmation process as developed through the Constitutional Convention proceedings and 
other manuscripts like the Federalist Papers. The second question surveyed the Framers’ view on 
human nature which will be best understood in light of the early writings and Federalist Papers. 
Additionally, the original election method for U.S. Senators will be best understood in light of the 
Federalist Papers as the Founders expressed a desire for insulation for the Senate. 
One can define a  ‘case study’ as “an approach capable of examining simple or complex 
phenomenon, with units of analysis varying from single individuals to large institutions to world-
changing events; it entails using a variety of lines of action in its data-gathering segments and can 
meaningfully make use of and contribute to the application theory” (Lune & Berg, 160). Moreover, 
in using the case study approach, historical analysis will be deployed to garner historical 
significance of the writings of the Founders and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and 
ratification process. Such a case study can also provide critical insight for areas of institutional 
shortcomings and areas for potential reform. In doing so, other questions that served as guiding 
questions will be further answered in as the advice and consent function was applied early in the 
nascent republic’s years. Moreover, there will be more clarity in understanding what the Founders 
considered appropriate in evaluating the Supreme Court nominees, as well as understanding 
further the expectation — not obligation — that the Senate would consider the nominee through a 
formal vote by the Senate body. 
Content Analysis 
The Appointments Clause 
An analysis of the text of the Appointments Clause will reveal assumptions and clues into the 
Founders’ plan for the appointment power. Below is the Appointments Clause, which is found in 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution:  
The President…shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of 
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law… 
Based on the text alone, one can make a number of apparent assumptions. First, the Appointments 
Clause itself is in Article II of the Constitution. It lays out the requirements for the Executive branch. 
The Founders anticipated the Executive would initiate the use of the appointment power with the 
words “The President…shall…appoint” (emphasis added). Here, the Founders required presidential 
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leadership within the appointments process by requiring the initial action of choice from the 
President.  
Second, the Framers gave the Senate the advice and consent function with the key words “by and 
with” (Appointments Clause). Here, the Founders indicated that the Senate, “by and with” its advice 
and consent “shall appoint” — or jointly appoint — the proposed candidate (Appointments Clause). 
In other words, the Senate and President, together, were expected to collaborate their efforts in 
evaluating and approving the candidate for the office under consideration. However, that the 
Founders did not place a ‘shall’ in the advice and consent portion for the Senate. This has profound 
implications for the Senate’s advice and consent role. The Founders knew how to require action 
from a specific branch of government. The fact that they chose not to require such action from the 
Senate indicates a level of discretion that is afforded to the Senate in applying the meaning of the 
text practically. One can reject the idea that the Senate is constitutionally obligated to vote on the 
Supreme Court candidate’s nomination, thereby answering one of the driving questions of this 
research paper. 
However, this does not exactly entitle the Senate to a passive and deferential role. Quite the 
contrary. The Founders expected, within the constitutional framework, for the Senate to be able to 
develop its own system of rules, procedures, customs, and traditions that would govern the 
institution. Such an understanding can be referenced in Article I, Section 5: “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings….” In affording loose language for the Appointments Clause, 
the Framers understood that the Senate would determine its own rules in how it chose to proceed 
on Supreme Court confirmations. Therefore, the Framers afforded  the Senate certain discretionary 
powers within the appointment power itself to act according to its own rules and procedures on 
various appointments, including the Supreme Court. However, one must note that the Framers, in 
assuming man’s depravity, knew that various issues would arise with such discretion in the Senate 
body on appointments. Therefore, to ascertain whether the Senate should serve an active or passive 
role, one must look beyond the scope of the text itself to understand the Framers’ intentions. The 
Appointments Clause drafting at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in the Federalist Papers, in 
other manuscripts and letters by the Founders, and in the early practice can ascertain the Framers’ 
intentions.  
The Constitutional Convention Proceedings 
Thankfully, the Framers provided succeeding generations with a transcript of the debates and 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787. James Madison – the author of the U.S. 
Constitution – recorded the proceedings of the Convention. Not much of the literature has surveyed 
what implications those proceedings have on the advice and consent function. Therefore, this 
portion of the paper will briefly review the two groups, the compromise, and the assumptions 
underpinning the development of the Appointment Clause. 
As synthesized by Adam White, “One group of delegates, led by James Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham, 
Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris, favored control of appointments by a strong 
executive” (110). On the other hand, “Charles Pinckney, Luther Martin, George Mason, Roger 
Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and John Rutledge favored legislative control of appointments” (White, 
110-111). These two groups had convincing arguments for each. Executive control over 
appointments would result in unity of thought, accountability, and transparency in who is at fault 




for a bad appointment, but individuals could persuade the President. Senate dominance over 
appointments, however, could result in a strong check on bad appointments and would also be 
susceptible to cabals or political patronage concerns if given the sole appointment power. 
As the Convention pressed onward, Edmond Randolph of Virginia put forth the ‘Big State’ Plan — or 
‘Virginia Plan’ — on May 29 (White, 111). Favoring population as a means for determining 
representation in the U.S. Congress, Randolph believed a national judiciary would be best chosen by 
a national legislature (White, 111). James Wilson — an ardent defender of a strong executive — 
detested the plan and believed “unity in the executive” would produce a better judiciary (White, 
111). The motion of appointment by the national legislature was tabled. On June 13, the method for 
selecting the national judiciary was once again brought up and delegates — such as Madison — 
proposed allowing the Senate more exclusively the role of selecting the justices (White, 112). After 
the debate, the motion was agreed to surprisingly. However, William Paterson presented the ‘Small 
State’ Plan — or ‘New Jersey Plan’ — under which the people would elect the national legislature 
the executive. This plan also would establish a unicameral legislature where each state has equal 
votes (Library of Congress). 
However, as noted by Eric Kasper, “the judicial appointment power stayed with the Senate alone in 
drafts of the Constitution” from July through August (549). The central fear coming forward from 
some delegates on the Senate’s appointment power stemmed from the notion that “too much input 
into the judicial selection process would result in legislators appointing judges as a way to repay 
political favors” (Kasper, 569). Following these debates, Alexander Hamilton proposed that the 
Executive should appoint or nominate the  udiciary to the Senate, which should have the right of 
rejecting or approving  the nominee (Harris, 21). Hamilton proposed the final product essentially of 
the Appointments Clause. It is surprising to note that the proposal came from Hamilton, the ardent 
proponent of executive power. Nominating would be in the hands of the Executive; considering and 
approving or rejecting would be the role of the Senate; and finally, the executive would ultimately 
appoint the individual if he or she so desired (Harris, 21). It is interesting to note that Hamilton saw 
the benefits of dividing the appointment power. 
Luther Martin asserted that the Senate would be the “best informed of characters” to appoint to the 
Supreme Court and other positions given their proximity to the states (Harris, 21). Roger Sherman 
again advocated for the Senate’s primacy in appointment power as there would be “better security” 
as it would “be less easy for candidates to intrigue with [or bribe] them, than with the Executive 
Magistrate” (Harris, 22). On July 21, Edmond Randolph disagreed with Sherman’s accusation and 
stated that the Senate would be susceptible to “cabals, personal regard, and other considerations 
unrelated to qualifications” (Harris, 22). George Mason detested executive appointment power on 
July 18 as he asserted sole executive appointment would lead to more appointments from the 
executive’s home state (Harris, 22).  
These debates, though divisive in nature, afford incredible insight into the delegate’s thoughts and 
developments of the appointment power as it progressed throughout the Convention. The various 
plans developed throughout the Convention— both the Small State and Large States Plans — 
demonstrate the complexity behind crafting a strong Constitution that would last for the ages. But 
the Compromise merged both the Small State and Large State Plans together. Under the Great 
Compromise, the Committee of the Eleven — or the committee of eleven delegates in charge of 
rectifying the disagreements in the Convention — proposed the formation of the Senate which 
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would allow each state’s legislatures to elect two senators from each state.  The people would elect 
The House of Representatives every two-years and would be based solely on representation. These 
developments had profound impacts on the consensus-building for the appointment power to the 
Supreme Court. 
As August came, the Committee of Eleven met and proposed changes to the Constitution. 
Appointment by the executive and by and with the advice of the Senate came more naturally as an 
acceptable proposition to provide a strong check and balance between the executive and the 
legislature after the approval of the bicameral legislation with a House and a Senate. On September 
7, the delegates officially approved the President’s and Senate’s shared appointment powers for 
Supreme Court Justices (Harris, 24). The passage was approved as the President was given the 
power to make recess appointments (Harris, 24). 
Massachusetts’ Advice and Consent Model 
The Founders used Massachusetts as the model for the Appointments Clause when they were 
reviewing the appointment power. Chiefly, Nathaniel Gorham referred to the Massachusetts 
Constitution as the leading document for influence in securing the dual-appointment method. The 
Appointments Clause for the Massachusetts Constitution states, “All judicial officers, [the attorney 
general], the solicitor-general, [all sheriffs], coroners, [and registers of probate], shall be nominated 
and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council” (Massachusetts 
Constitution). Clearly, the language is similar to the Appointments Clause within the U.S. 
Constitution; however, the council advises and consents to the nominee instead of the legislature. 
In order for the Massachusetts’ governor and council to work through the advice and consent 
inclusion, the governor  appointed the judicial nominee, and within one to three weeks, the council 
had responded (White 136). The council only recorded the appointments in which it advised and 
consented to, excluding the ones they did not confirmed (White 137). This is an interesting 
component to wrestle with since the Senate from its inception has publicly recorded the Supreme 
Court nomination votes. Now, some votes were recorded by voice and considered with unanimous 
support.  Even Supreme Court nominees who were rejected were publicly declared. Regardless, in 
both scenarios the Founders acknowledged a Senate that would be actively involved in reviewing 
the Supreme Court nominee, offering advice on the nominee or potential candidates to nominate, 
and eventually approving or rejecting the nominee. The Massachusetts advice and consent model 
supports this notion. 
Throughout the process, certain items were pertinent to understanding advice and consent. First, 
the Founders seemed to collectively agree upon what advice and consent meant without the 
necessity to debate its inherent meaning. Such a common understanding probably resulted from 
their prior experiences in recording the Massachusetts’ council  when advising the governor on 
judicial appointments. Second, the Founders merged the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan in 
the Committee on Detail. Such a compromise established the election of senators via the state 
legislatures. Hence, the Founders believed this would be a wise and necessary check against both 
the president in the appointment power over Supreme Court Justices among other areas of checks 
and balances, as well as a check against the passions of the people. 
One should also remember that the final plan that was eventually adopted was first proposed by 
Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s belief in a strong, unitary executive contrasted differently from the 
plan adopted at the Constitutional Convention. His viewpoints will be explained through his 




contributions in the next section. In the end, the Founders believed that dividing the appointment 
power between the president and the Senate would produce a safer, less tyrannical government. 
The Senate’s check upon the president would effectively curb the appointment of improper officials 
to the Supreme Court. 
The Federalist Papers 
The Framers created a constitutional framework and federal system that was based on separation 
of powers, division of responsibilities and accountability, and checks and balances associated 
within each new branch of government. In other words, the framework was “more prone to 
obstructionism than comparable systems” (Weaver 1717). Specifically, the advice and consent 
function has served as a check upon the president given that 37 out of 163 nominations to the 
Supreme Court have not survived the Supreme Court confirmation process within the U.S. Senate 
(“Supreme Court nominations”). In contrast, between the Founding and 2011, the Senate has 
rejected only fifteen cabinet nominees, demonstrating a more robust application of the Senate’s 
advice and consent power (Weaver 1730). Moreover, the Senate also demonstrates the importance 
of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary as a whole in the national government. 
Under the guise of checks and balances, each participant within the Supreme Court confirmation 
process—the president and his staff, the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate body, and the 
judicial nominee—must “modify their behavior” to achieve an optimal outcome (Friedland 177). 
Specifically, the president must moderate his selection of a nominee on occasion in order to assure 
a smoother confirmation process by avoiding ideologues and extreme candidates (Weaver 1731). 
The Senate has adjusted its review methods concerning the various candidates at times as well, 
especially concerning party considerations of the Senate majority and the party of the president 
(Friedland 177). Even the judicial nominee may have to modify his or her behavior by being more 
precise or more ambiguous and withholding during the confirmation process on his or her 
philosophical viewpoints. 
One should note that this level of inefficiency within the federal framework is good. Stephen 
Friedland touched on the benefits of having a thorough, comprehensive confirmation process. 
Specifically, he evaluated having more input from a variety of sources as a positive aspect that 
would only strengthen the overall government: 
It eliminates the singular viewpoint and its impulsiveness and susceptibility to a 
lack of questioning, and instead values the idea of freedom of speech and 
differing viewpoints—of the Senate and the President, at least—and also 
emulates an adversary system of truth seeking…In addition, the hearing 
mechanism by itself creates at least a path to transparency, if not to the truth 
(177-178). 
Friedland’s reflections on the adversarial system of checks and balances underscores the Framers’ 
mindset found in Federalist Papers Nos. 48-51, which were written by James Madison. 
In Federalist No. 48, Madison argues that the three branches of government should “provide 
practical security for each, against the invasion of the others” (No. 48).  In Federalist No. 51, 
Madison continues this theme of distrust of the government and a desire to uphold a “constitutional 
equilibrium” (No. 49) by devising a system of checks, which he referred to as “auxiliary 
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precautions” (No. 51). He rationalized that instituting these seemingly obstructionist and inefficient 
checks was necessary because “[ambition] must be made to counteract ambition” (No. 51). Madison 
and the Framers understood all too well that devising a system of divided powers on paper was not 
enough; additionally, the Framers also knew that the “fountain of authority, the people,” were not 
always the most trustworthy in selecting people for specific positions within the government—
especially the independent judiciary (No. 51). For this reason, the Framers installed the 
appointment of the judiciary by the president and the Senate. The “peculiar qualifications” of the 
justices combined with their “permanent tenure” must not be based on an election by the people for 
fear of majoritarian, mob-rule-like consequences (No. 51). 
One of the more famous portions of the Federalist Papers appears in Federalist No. 51, in which 
Madison attributes human nature as the rationale for such a level of inefficiency and 
obstructionism. Madison wrote the following in Federalist No. 51: 
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
Madison demonstrates the fallen aspect of human nature and how the sinful habits of mankind have 
led to the necessity to design a government in a way that would reflect those attributes. Man is 
naturally prideful, selfish, and seeking his own will; when given the chance, he will pursue his 
personal ambition and desires to their naturally conclusive ends and will use any means to 
accomplish them. Federalist No. 51 is the genius justification of the framework of the federal 
government. 
The Framers’ discussion continued as the Founders believed the legislature to be the most 
dangerous of the branches as it is “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex” (No. 48). Madison noted that history has shown the “tendency of 
republican governments” to aggrandize the legislature “at the expense of the other departments” 
(No. 49), and that it “necessarily predominates” in the republican governmental models (No. 51). 
Therefore, to avoid an “elective despotism” (No. 48), the Framers divided the legislature into the 
House and the Senate with provisions of powers enumerated or granted to each branch of the 
legislature. Furthermore, to craft a more distinct, bicameral legislature, the Founders rendered 
“different modes of election and different principles of action” (No. 51). These electoral differences 
and responsibilities have profound implications for even the Supreme Court confirmation process. 
Original Senate Election 
This section of the paper will seek to understand the Founders’ view of the original Senate election 
mode by which they established in the Constitution and how that impacted their decision for the 
advice and consent power. With the Senate removed a degree from the people, it can be insulated 
from the people’s strong passions. James Madison considered the passions of factions to be the 
most concerning issue within the nascent United States political sphere, and the rise of factions 
could lead to significantly negative implications for the government (No. 10). Elective despotism 
would become the norm as the passions of most individuals would only be played out against the 
will of the minority (No. 48). However, the Senate acts as a direct check to the people on a few 
levels. First, the election of the Senate by the state legislatures was chosen because the Founders 




believed the Senate should have a degree of separation between the Senate and the people (No. 39). 
Second, a third of the Senate is re-elected every two years on a six-year term basis. Logistically, it 
would take a protracted amount of time to inaugurate significant change to the governmental 
structure, which the Founders believed would be necessary for preventing a dangerous level of 
revolutionary change. Third, the Senate was intended to be an equal body of two senators from 
each state. Such a plan was to counteract the population-based House of Representatives and would 
therefore further the distinctions between the two branches and their purposes (Article II). Fourth, 
the Senate was expected to check the president in a variety of functions, from treaty confirmation 
processes to legislation and on appointments. Even James Madison indicated that some level of 
public opinion would factor into the Supreme Court confirmation process, saying, “Even the judges, 
with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote 
choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the 
republican standard” (No. 39). However, this degree of autonomy was intended to insulate the 
Senate from majoritarian moods, as well as preserve the independence and legitimacy of the 
judiciary. The Founders believed the Senate’s removal from the people via their election mode 
would not only give the Senate a certain level of autonomy from the electorate from directly 
influencing their advice and consent function, but also their removal from the people would afford 
the Senate the discretion and reflection it needed in reviewing and choosing to accept or reject the 
nominee. 
Coming on the heels of the populist movement in the early twentieth century, the Senate’s mode of 
election was changed in the Seventeenth Amendment, which called for the “Senate of the United 
States…[to be] elected by the people…” (Clause 1, Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution). Such 
a change affected the role of the Senate in a subtle, yet substantial way; the Senate was no longer 
afforded the level of insulation in their individual responses to a Supreme Court nomination. Each 
senator was now expected to explain to voters why they decided to vote to approve or reject the 
nominee placed forward by the president to the Supreme Court. Such a change has had direct 
impacts on senatorial and presidential elections. Specifically, public opinion can become the 
determinative factor in influencing how certain Senators choose to vote on a Supreme Court 
nomination, especially in their re-election year (Davis 87). The presidential and midterm elections 
from the 2010s are great examples of such partisanship, polarization, and political posturing that 
flows forward from direct Senate elections. The appointment of candidates like Neil Gorsuch and 
Brett Kavanaugh placed Red-State Democrats—or Democratic Senators from traditionally 
Republican states—like Joe Manchin (D-WV), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), Claire McCaskill (D-MO) in a 
position to either support the president’s nominee and expect favorable reaction from their state 
voters in November or to follow the party line and oppose the nominee in the hopes that the 
consequences do not outweigh the benefits (Arkin).  
In his book Electing Justice, Richard Davis explores the divisive process as a result of more impact 
from interest groups and media agencies. For example, some interest groups provide lists of judicial 
candidates for presidential consideration (Davis 109); interest groups offer questions for Senators 
to use (Davis 111), and both media agencies’ interest groups also provide public support or 
condemnation to influence the outcome of a Supreme Court nomination (Davis 111). Interest 
groups spend millions of dollars to influence the outcome of senatorial elections in the hopes that 
future Supreme Court nominations will go in the direction the interest group prefers. Moreover, 
how media groups portray the nominee will impact how the American electorate perceives the 
nominee, even if the public is unaware of potential biases or misrepresentations. The media’s 
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portrayal of Supreme Court nominees significantly impacts the way voters perceive the nominee as 
well, thereby impacting senatorial considerations (Davis 87). 
Therefore, if both the media and interest groups are actively influencing the Supreme Court 
nomination processes, then Senate elections will be significantly impacted by their presence. 
Though the Founders anticipated some level of public influence in the Supreme Court confirmation 
process, it was more or less anticipated in the general desire of a qualified nominee who was above 
reproach that the public would find acceptable. The Founders did not anticipate the people to 
essentially ‘elect’ the Supreme Court justices by virtue of direct Senate elections. The Founders saw 
the importance of establishing and preserving an independent judiciary. Such a position was 
blatantly argued for in Federalist No. 78, which states, “The complete independence of the courts of 
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution” (No. 78). Furthermore, some Anti-
Federalists suggested the judiciary would check Congress and the people by voiding a popular piece 
of legislation passed by Congress. Hamilton corrects these critiques of the Constitution by asserting 
the following in Federalist No. 78: 
Where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, 
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. 
They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not 
fundamental. 
Hamilton believes that the judiciary is to uphold the Constitution above all else, including the 
expressed will of the people. Therefore, the judiciary is called to a high standard of independence 
and removal from the people. Even more so, Hamilton questions the appointments and who should 
make them. Hamilton asserts that a single branch would not afford the proper character for the 
Supreme Court (No. 78). He writes of public opinion’s effect on Supreme Court nominations in 
Federalist No. 78: 
If [the power of making appointments was given] to the people, or to persons 
chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition 
to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but 
the Constitution and the laws. 
How much more than should the Senate, which either confirms or rejects Supreme Court nominees 
and was originally elected by the state legislatures, be detached from momentary passions of the 
people? The Founders certainly considered this to be an issue of the utmost importance; therefore, 
their original understanding of Senate’s election via the state legislatures and not by the people was 
for the protection of not only the judiciary in preserving its independence, but also for the Senate in 
preserving its prestige and importance in appointing judicial nominees to the nation’s highest 
bench in the land. 
The Federalist Papers (Continued) 
In Federalist No. 66, Hamilton offers the reader a number of important assumptions on the extent 
of the Senate’s powers within its advice and consent role. First, Hamilton assumes an energetic and 
active Senate. For example, Hamilton writes in objection to detractors who feared an aristocracy 
that the Senate “is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and 
in the appointment to offices” (No. 66). Moreover, Hamilton praises this dual-appointing method as 




it will lead to “a more intelligible, if not a more certain result” (No. 66). Furthermore, Hamilton 
rejects the notion that patronage will dominate within the dual-appointment method between the 
executive and legislative branches. Hamilton asserts instead that those involved in the appointment 
process will be interested in the “respectable and prosperous administration of affairs” of the laws 
enacted and will reject candidates who have “proved themselves unworthy of the confidence” by 
the two branches to fulfill the duties and obligations instilled in them (No. 66). In other words, 
Hamilton and the Federalists believed the legislature and the executive would take care in 
appointing an individual who was above reproach, well-qualified for the role, and faithful in 
discharging the duties of the judiciary. 
Hamilton offers insight into the process of appointment as found within the guise of the 
Appointments Clause. He declares that the president’s role will be to nominate and with the 
concurrence of the Senate appoint the individual confirmed to the office (No. 66). One can assume 
that Hamilton understood the appointment power to be a shared power and responsibility between 
the two branches. Hamilton claims there will be no “exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate” 
(No. 66). Rather, the Senate “may defeat one choice of the Executive and oblige him to make 
another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify or reject the choice of the 
President” (No. 66).  
Hamilton makes several assumptions for the reader. First, the choice is ultimately up to the 
president; he or she alone must choose to nominate an individual to the Supreme Court or other 
offices as they arise. Second, the Senate may “entertain a preference to some other person” (No. 66), 
but that does not imply that the president will subsequently nominate such an individual. Hamilton 
hints at the Senate’s pre-advisory role by asserting that the Senate may make it known to the 
president which candidates or type of candidates the Senate would find favorable to appoint to the 
Supreme Court. Third, the Senate’s responsibility is to either “reject or ratify” (No. 66). Surprisingly 
enough, Hamilton does not leave room for the Senate to forego an action on the nomination; he 
would rather the Senate hold a full-body vote in the least to reject or ratify the nominee. Next, if the 
Senate chose to reject the nomination, there would be no guarantee that the president would 
subsequently nominate their preferred candidate (No. 66). Hamilton implies that the Senate would 
inherently be an active body and could not afford to not act within the scope of its powers on a 
nomination, especially to the Supreme Court. However, the absence of a declaration of necessity to 
hold an up or down vote on nominees put forward by the president still leaves open the room for 
the Senate to act under the guise of its own rules and procedures. While it may be conceded that 
Hamilton asserts that the Senate could “feel any other complacency towards the object of an 
appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire,” Hamilton also declared that 
both branches would each be interested in appointing the right character (No. 66). 
Federalist No. 76 was written in direct response to concerns over the Appointments Clause. 
Hamilton states that the president would be “better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar 
qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior 
discernment” (No. 76). Hamilton indicates that the appointment powers’ nominations would be 
best suited under the guise of a single individual who would not be distracted by a number of 
different proclivities. Furthermore, an individual would be better suited to “investigate with care 
the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled” (No. 76) and will seek out individuals based on the 
pre-requisite of filling the office with the proper individual. Contrastingly, if the Senate were to 
nominate, the distraction and “diversity of views, feelings and interests” would unnecessarily 
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dominate the process, and “the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight” (No. 
76). 
Hamilton provides four areas for the Senate to consider for review. He ensures that the Senate’s 
check upon the president in appointing persons to the Supreme Court and other offices would have 
a “silent operation” that would serve as an “excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the 
president” (No. 76). Moreover, the Senate’s advice and consent check would “prevent the 
appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal 
attachment, or from a view of popularity” (No. 76). Such a pronouncement has profound 
implications for the Supreme Court confirmation process. It should be stressed that Hamilton did 
not mention political allegiance, constitutional philosophy, or even general ideology as reasons to 
oppose a nominee. Therefore, the absence speaks volumes in terms of general acceptance of these 
aspects in moderation for Supreme Court nomination considerations. In order to counteract 
extreme partisan politics from overcoming the system, Hamilton even includes the notion that 
popularity should not play a factor in supporting a Supreme Court nominee. Hamilton uses the 
word ‘popularity’ to also refer to candidates who may be politically expedient or popular, but unfit 
to serve on the Court given their lack of experience. 
Also, Hamilton makes the case for presidential preference in the selection of the judicial nominee. 
Hamilton argues that, though the Senate must confer approval upon the nominee, the eventual 
appointee to the office in any case will come from the president’s preference in the end, “though 
perhaps not in the first degree,” Hamilton writes (No. 76). He asserts that because the Senate can 
reject the nominee, “the danger to his own reputation”—both politically and personally—would 
motivate the president to take special care in appointing a strong candidate (No. 76). Hamilton 
rejects patronage arguments as the Senate would have no benefit to “confer” upon the president 
(No. 77). Rather, the Senate’s ability to influence the president would rest solely in “restraining” the 
president (No. 77). In other words, Hamilton notes that the Senate’s ability to reject a nominee 
would have such an effect as to fully check the president. Regarding responsibility, Hamilton wrote 
the following: “The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. 
The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate” (No. 77). 
In all, it is imperative to note that Hamilton confers the ability of the Senate to review the nominee’s 
fitness for the office, approve the nominee, or fully check the president by rejecting the nominee. 
The Federalist Papers’ timely warnings are a harbinger of confirmation processes to come. The 
difficulty in reviewing the exhaustive amount of data within the Federalist Papers is the lack of 
direct discussion on specific reasons for the Senate’s rejecting of the nominee—save for 
presidential favoritism, state preference, familial linkage, or against general popularity. Moreover, 
Hamilton does not discuss ways to review the nominee, specifically what could be “fair game” 
within that review process. Therefore, it is safe to assume that since the Founders afforded the 
Senate and House each discretion in establishing their own chamber rules and procedures, 
Hamilton understood the Senate would broadly and strongly hold its discretionary powers within 
the context of appointment. 
Early Writings 
Various other writings serve as important indicators in ascertaining the original meaning behind 
advice and consent as considered by the Founders. Various individuals—former Constitutional 




Convention delegates, prominent members in American society, and even early U.S. presidents—
discussed the appointment power process that afforded key insight into the Senate’s advice and 
consent role. President George Washington wrote that he believed Thomas Jefferson and John Jay 
concurred with his assertion of executive dominance within the appointment power. He recorded 
his thoughts in his diary, saying, “The Senate’s powers “extend no farther than to an approbation or 
disapprobation of the person nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and vested in 
the President by the Constitution” (McGinnis). Washington assumes here that the Senate plays a 
more limited role in the context of appointment power and believes that the Senate should limit 
itself to only acceptance or rejection of the nominee. After submitting the first treaty for 
consideration by the U.S. Senate under its ‘Advice and Consent’ role for the Jay Treaty, Washington 
wrote the following entry in his journal on August 8, 1789,  which reads, “Neither of which might be 
agreeable; and the latter improper; for as the President has a right to nominate without assigning 
his reasons, has the Senate a right to dissent without giving theirs” (Harris 39). Granted, this was in 
response to a treaty ratification which is different from the appointment power; however, it should 
be noted that the Senate’s advice and consent role was not too distinguishable in treaty ratification 
or judicial confirmation. Therefore, it is safe to assume that President Washington understood their 
critical role of confirmation or rejection was similar in both scenarios, and he knew that their ability 
to reject a nominee or treaty would be the prerogative of the Senate. He assumed an active Senate 
model that would “dissent” on the nomination by a vote, which matches much of what the other 
Founders understood at the time. 
James Madison spoke on the House floor concerning the issue of removal power because some 
contested the executive alone had the authority to remove while others moved to involve the 
Senate since it was a part of the appointment power. Concerning the notion that the Senate should 
be involved, Madison stated, “If the constitution had not qualified the power of the president in 
appointing to office, by associating the senate with him in that business, would it not be clear that 
he would have the right by virtue of his executive power to make such appointment?” (Selected 
Writings of James Madison 180). Though he recognizes the advice and consent of the Senate as a 
shared power in the appointment power, Madison expresses that removal power is not of the same 
mold. Suffice it to say that Madison assumes an active Senate involved in the appointment process 
of the judicial nominees to the Supreme Court. When it comes to appointing individuals during 
recess appointments, he writes that “[the President] can place no man in the vacancy whom the 
senate shall not approve” (Selected Writings of James Madison 184). Again, Madison is assuming 
here an active Senate that would hold at least a vote on the nominee for the Supreme Court. 
James Iredell, a former Supreme Court Justice and prominent North Carolina delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, wrote about the advice and consent role of the Senate: 
As to offices, the Senate has no other influence but a restraint on improper appointments. The 
President proposes such a man for such an office. The Senate has to consider upon it. If they think 
him improper, the President must nominate another, whose appointment ultimately again depends 
upon the Senate. (McGinnis) 
One could argue that this refutes the pre-nomination role many considered the Senate to have for 
the Supreme Court nominations. However, one could also argue that the Senate would assume the 
prerogative of telling the president of an individual or type of individual that the Senate—or select 
Senators, Senate Majority leader, or Senate Judiciary Committee members—would support. 
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Another important aspect to consider comes from those who opposed the Constitution, many of 
whom were considered Anti-Federalists. Virginia Delegate George Mason refused at the close of the 
Constitutional Convention to sign his name to the Committee of Style report, which demonstrated 
that he opposed the drafted Constitution (Mason, Gunston Hall). In a letter printed for the public on 
November 22, 1787 in the Virginia Journal, George Mason wrote of the appointment power by 
saying, “From this fatal defect has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of 
public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature 
and the supreme Executive” (Mason, Gunston Hall).. Mason seems to suggest that he objects to the 
active Senate role that the Founders installed for the appointment power. This objection to the 
Senate’s power indicates that the Founders collectively understood at least in some level the active 
power the Senate had in its advice and consent power. 
Both Edmund Randolph and Luther Martin refused to sign the Constitution in support of its 
ratification. One of their main objections centered around the dual-appointment mode of the 
Supreme Court nominations. In the appointment power, Randolph opposed the inclusion of the 
president as that would necessarily lead to the increase in his powers (Marcotte 533). Luther 
Martin also refused to sign the Constitution, but he feared the lack of a check on the president in the 
appointment process (Marcotte 534). These two declarations alone indicate that there was favor in 
the utilization of an active Senate in the appointments process for the Supreme Court. 
James Wilson, who was argued to be the inventor of the modern presidency, “objected to the mode 
of appointing, as blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive” was a mistake in his eyes 
(Farrand 538, Vol. II). Wilson believed that “there can be no good Executive without a responsible 
appointment of officers to execute” (Farrand 530, Vol. II). Gouverneur Morris also understood the 
complexity of the Senate’s advice and consent check against the president. In contrast to James 
Wilson’s comments, Morris stated, “As the President was to nominate, there would be 
responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security” (Farrand 530, Vol. II). 
Morris indicates that there is a dual mode of appointing individuals to the Supreme Court, of which 
the U.S. Senate would be an active participant. 
Historic Analysis & Case Studies 
An early version of Senate opposition to a judicial nominee to the Supreme Court came early in the 
nascent country’s history under President George Washington. John Rutledge—a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention and a signer to the U.S. Constitution—was originally appointed by 
President George Washington to the Supreme Court in 1789 to be an Associate Justice. He served 
from 1789 to 1791 before resigning to serve as South Carolina’s Chief Justice for the state supreme 
court (Harris 42-3). Chief Justice John Jay announced his resignation (Harris 42-3). When he heard 
of the open position to serve as the Chief Justice, John Rutledge wrote George Washington “a letter 
remarkable letter…applying for the Supreme Court appointment” (Harris 43). President 
Washington promptly offered him the position (Harris 43).  
However, prior to his appointment, Rutledge spoke publicly at a Charleston event, decrying the Jay 
Treaty which normalized trading relations with former colonizer, Great Britain (Harris 43). Many 
viewed Rutledge as mentally deranged with “eyewitness testimony” to his speech in South Carolina 
against the Jay Treaty cited as a proof of this claim (Ross 642). Some attributed his mental insanity 




to the overall rationale to oppose his nomination. After all, evaluating his mental capacities in this 
specific case would only be fair and in keeping with the review of the nominee’s general fitness to 
serve. However, James Gauch provides strong reasoning to oppose the notion that his nomination 
could have been rejected on grounds of his mental instability. He believes that in order for him to 
have been appointed to the highest bench in the land, he would have had to pass Washington’s “stiff 
criteria,” which would also simultaneously call into question Washington’s judgment (360). Next, 
the people of South Carolina trusted his judgment by electing him Chief Justice of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court (Gauch 360). His recess appointment “evidenced no mental unsoundness” (Gauch 
360). Nothing but Rutledge’s opposition to the Jay Treaty should be accredited to the failure of his 
nomination to the Supreme Court. In doing so, scholars place Rutledge’s rejection for Chief Justice 
to the Supreme Court squarely in the box as a politically motivated opposition to his nomination. 
Though Rutledge served as the Chief Justice via a recess appointment, he lost in the Senate by a vote 
of fourteen to ten (Ross 642). Thomas Jefferson wrote William Giles a letter in response to the 
Rutledge nomination, saying, “The rejection of Mr. Rutledge by the Senate is a bold thing, because 
they cannot pretend any objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty” (Gauch 361).  
The results of the Senate’s actions speak boldly. For one, the Senate acted on the nomination and 
neither delayed a response, nor did they completely ignore the nomination. Second, President 
Washington did not consider the rejection unconstitutional (Ross 642). Instead, Washington 
proceeded to nominate another individual to fill the position, following in the mold of his position 
earlier when he said, “for as the President has a right to nominate without assigning his reasons, 
has the Senate a right to dissent without giving theirs” (Harris 39). The former delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 were notably Senators who rejected a fellow colleague from the 
Convention purely on partisan grounds (Marcus and Perry 99). Another major aspect to consider 
concerns the fact that the Senate used political disagreements as a basis for rejection of the 
nominee. Harris writes that the “Senate thus established a precedent of inquiring into the political 
views and ideas of persons nominated for public office and of rejecting a nominee whose views do 
not correspond to those of the majority of the Senate” (43). Ross considered Rutledge’s failed 
nomination as political by nature, and “unrelated to his fitness to serve on the Court” (643).  
The Senate’s political considerations that were attached to Rutledge’s confirmation process—along 
with acquiescence by key individuals, including President Washington and other Founding 
Fathers—clearly indicated that political considerations were to some extent acceptable to the 
confirmation process. Such an acceptance has ushered in an unnecessary amount of political and 
judicial philosophy considerations into the Supreme Court confirmation process. Joseph Harris 
wrote the following on the early development of Supreme Court confirmation processes: 
Appointments were influenced greatly by political consideration, and the action of the Senate was 
fully as political as that of the President. Few of the rejections of Supreme Court nominations in this 
period can be ascribed to any lack of qualifications on the part of the nominees; for the most part 
they were due to political differences between the President and a majority of the Senate. (303) 
Ross records in his book a number of other failed Supreme Court nominations that were the result 
of political considerations instead of qualifications, including Alexander Wolcott in 1871, Ebenezer 
Hoar in 1870, and both William B. Hornblower and Wheeler H. Peckham in 1894 (643). The lack of 
direct limitation in the Constitution of the Senate’s ability to utilize political considerations, 
personal character attributes, or someone outside of the mainstream of judicial philosophy indicate 
that the Founders understood that some level of these considerations would inevitably fall within 
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the guise of the advice and consent function. Heritage Foundation scholar McGinnis writes that the 
Senate has a right to check the president to prevent him from appointing individuals that “have 
unsound principles as well as blemished characters.” 
As stated before, the major evaluation criteria for early Founders in developing the framework for 
the appointment power rested in the nominee’s qualifications. The dual-appointment power 
ensured that the individual ultimately appointed to the Supreme Court would be of the highest 
qualifications and background with the strong capability to fulfill the role of Justice on the Court. 
However, the Founders began a trend of using political evaluative criteria for review. This is not 
new, and one should note that the Founders believed some political considerations were necessary 
for the review of the nominee.  
When considering the judicial appointment power, James Madison wrote a proposal that said the 
president would submit a nomination, and unless two-thirds vote by the Senate rejected the 
nomination on the grounds of “any flagrant partiality or error,” the nomination would proceed as 
approved (Kasper 555). Kasper draws an interesting point in his review of this portion of writing. 
Madison assumes that some level of partiality would be acceptable in the Supreme Court 
confirmation process or that some level of political consideration would be appropriate. Madison’s 
use of the words “flagrant partiality or error” indicates that the Founders anticipated judicial 
qualifications as the most suitable route for questioning and considering nominees to the Supreme 
Court with some amount of political consideration acceptable (emphasis added). This places the 
Senate in a difficult position, though, given the fact that in order to determine what some political 
consideration looks like, one would almost have to install a limit in terms of reviewing nominees, 
which may put the Senate at a disadvantage politically during the Supreme Court confirmation 
process. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
One can see the myriad of complexities concerning the Senate’s advice and consent function. 
Though the Founders did not explicitly state to what extent they believed certain qualifications 
would be used, they did implicitly provide context in how they anticipated the appointment power 
to be used. One can deduce certain points from their early writings such as letters amongst each 
other and the Federalist Papers, as well as from the developments of the Constitutional Convention 
and early practices of the appointment power in the formative years of the country following 
ratification of the Constitution. 
Overall, the Founders originally intended for an active Senate advice and consent function, one that 
would be powerful enough and effective enough to check the president from appointing an unfit 
individual to the Supreme Court. They anticipated a back and forth in prior advisement on 
nominees, as well as advisement on the judicial candidate officially nominated by the president. The 
Senate was then expected to review the eventual judicial nominee for the Supreme Court. However, 
based on the vague text of the Appointments Clause and combined with the understanding the 
Founders provided in the Federalist Papers, the Founders expected the Senate to decide how to 
best proceed in evaluating the candidates in the context of Article I, Section 5 powers to determine 
its own rules and procedures. They anticipated professional qualifications and judicial temperance 
to be reviewed as major components in evaluating the candidate. The Founders also believed some 




level of political consideration would be used in the appointment of Justices. They built the Senate 
election method as a way of checking the popularity of a candidate or president from influencing 
how Senators viewed political qualifications in the Supreme Court confirmation process. 
Following this research process, one should consider certain themes. First, the Founders exerted 
energy and effort in deciding how the appointment power would be distributed. They understood 
the risks involved in wrongly assigning this particular power and how just one branch could 
accumulate too much power in its own hands at the expenses of the other two branches. Second, 
the Founders also drew from specific principles of governmental power, which informed their 
understanding of how to best establish a government that would fulfill the intent of pursuing good 
governance and justice for the people of the United States of America. These driving principles 
included the following: human nature and man’s selfish motives hindered an individual’s ability to 
not desire more power; separation of powers became a consistent theme as the Founders 
understood the necessity in apportioning certain powers amongst three separate, distinct, and 
independent branches of the federal government; and, checks and balances informed the practice of 
government, and delineated the extent of the branches’ powers and how they balanced against each 
other. Such principles are seen blatantly in the designing of the advice and consent function 
throughout the Constitutional Convention, Federalist Papers and other writings, as well as early 
practices of the government. 
Third, as described under the notion of checks and balances, the appointment power as designed by 
the Founders was intended to be a shared power and responsibility between the executive and 
legislative branch. The Founders expected formal and informal negotiation between the Senate and 
the president on appointing the most suitable individuals to the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, the 
Founders intended for the Senate to ‘check’ the president for presidential favoritism, state 
preference, familial linkage, or against general popularity. The Founders envisioned the Senate 
reviewing the individual’s qualifications, judicial temperance, and general fitness to discharge the 
duties of a Justice on the Supreme Court. Senators were also afforded some level of discretion in 
reviewing the nominee’s political and judicial philosophy. By no means did the Founders hope or 
anticipate these considerations—political and judicial philosophy—would be the determining 
factor for denial of the judicial nominee. While the Founders may have foreseen such a scenario 
given the ambiguous language in the Appointments Clause, they did not believe such “flagrant 
partiality” would amount to reason enough to reject the nominee altogether on political 
considerations alone.  
This discretionary power in reviewing the president’s judicial nominee is found within the vague 
language of the Appointments Clause. The lack of a direct call to action from the Senate affords it 
certain flexibility in determining how it intends to review the nominee. The Senate’s ability to 
determine the rules and procedures of its own chamber as according to Article I, Section 5 garners a 
stronger sense of duty and responsibility to check the president. Such a power should embolden the 
Senate to soberly understand the immense role it has been given and recognize its responsibility to 
assume an active role in properly checking the president, not in the sense of rejecting the nominee 
as the only means to check the president but to view the role of evaluating the nominee as 
balancing and checking the president. 
Fourth, the Founders originally intended the Senate to be elected by the state legislatures to avoid 
the direct, majoritarian pressures upon Senators for these momentous decisions. The Founders 
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desired this degree of separation from the people in order to produce a more independent and 
legitimate Supreme Court. The direct election of senators has only increased the use of partisanship 
and political posturing amongst senators, as well as among the potential Supreme Court nominees 
as presidents seek to pick ideological candidates who may boost their standing amongst their 
constituents. Senators have felt the intense pressures from interest groups, media agencies, and the 
voters themselves as millions of dollars pour into Senate elections. Such constitutional shifts have 
produced dangerous consequences for the future of the judiciary, as well as the role of the Senate as 
senators may seek to satisfy their voters over their conscience for their vote on a Supreme Court 
nominee. 
The Founders originally envisioned for the Senate to assume an active role in advising and 
consenting on the Supreme Court nominees. Based on their early writings and manuscripts, their 
drive for philosophical and political principles, and their proceedings at the Constitutional 
Convention, the Founders intended for the Senate to assume a strong responsibility in reviewing 
the nominee by advising which nominee to appoint and by consenting—or rejecting—the nominee. 
The Founders anticipated for a level of inefficiency. Such a level of inefficiency is a good thing and 
would promote a stronger level of rigor in checking the president from appointing the wrong 
individual to the Supreme Court. The Founders anticipated at least some form of either accepting or 
rejecting the Supreme Court nominee, and this expectation was practiced in the early years of the 
American republic, such as John Rutledge’s nomination. 
Regardless, the Founders did not want for the Senate to be caught up in a political circus over 
Supreme Court nominees. If the Senate abdicated from its responsibilities in evaluating the 
nominee in a respectful and sober-minded manner, then the Supreme Court’s respectability would 
only diminish. The Senate’s reputation as a credible institution to check the president’s nominating 
power would be severely questioned, leading more ideologically oriented candidates to the 
Supreme Court versus level-headed and even-handed justices. The risks are too high for the Senate 
to not fulfill its proper advice and consent role in the context of the Founders’ original intentions 
and aspirations.  
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